Clothed
in myth and legend and held in sacred awe by the Sioux Indian,
Lake Okoboji and Spirit Lake had rested in seclusion for ages at
the headwaters of the Little Sioux. To the red men these lakes
had been a sort of Mecca, second only to the red pipestone
quarry to the northwest, for the silent adoration and worship of
the Spirit. Although the region had been little disturbed by the
whites the Sioux were becoming uneasy as the frontier continued
its westward advance. By the middle of the nineteenth century
the meeting and clashing of the two races became more frequent.
This rivalry of the races was engendered by the white man's
disregard of what the Indian held as sacred: it was embittered
by the unstable policies of the government. Finally, in the
early days of March, 1857, came one of those tragic events in
the long series of misguided attempts to deal with the Indian
and solve the problem of the frontier. In this terrible tragedy
in the pioneer history of northwestern Iowa, the lives of more
than forty white people were sacrificed. The Spirit Lake
Massacre was the result of an Indian policy which has been
characterized as vacillating, full of inconsistencies and
incongruities, of experiments and failures. For the Sioux this
policy had been the cause of frequent humiliation.
It must be frankly admitted that in dealing with the Indian the
whites too often lost sight of the fact that the red man was
really a human being, seeking to have his person as well as his
rights respected. To compel the respect which his proud spirit
demanded, he frequently resorted to massacre. In fact, an Indian
was open to insults and abuse from his fellow tribesmen until he
had killed a foe.
To some extent the Indian appreciated his own inferiority, and
he was expectantly on the alert to prevent being over-reached
and deceived by the whites. Suspicious by nature, he became
doubly so when his activities brought him into relation with
another race. Unhappily he was not always wrong in his
suspicions of the white man's deception, and many unpleasant
border difficulties sprang from his attempts to match deception
with deception. Physically superb, he too often had recourse to
those physical means of redress that have marked the history of
the frontier with tales of tragic revenge.
Accustomed to the matching of intellects, the whites frequently
resorted to the stilted verbiage of treaties in their efforts to
push the Indian farther toward the setting sun. In these
treaties the red man found much cause for complaint not so much
in the strict wording of the documents themselves as in the
management of affairs they induced. This too often exasperated
and provoked the Indian.
To him the Iowa country was a paradise. Not only was it his home
and hunting ground, but here centered much of the traditional
lore of his tribe and race. Thus Iowa was doubly dear to him and
worth his most determined effort to hold. As the wave of
settlements advanced, the Indian was induced to sell sometimes
under circumstances provoking a strong suspicion of compulsion
rather than voluntary agreement in the transfer. He felt
instinctively that he had to retire, but in his racial pride he
resented the necessity. He knew well the later traditions of his
race, in the light of which he could foresee that in a very
brief time force, which "comprises the elements of all Indian
treaties," would be used to drive him from his domain.
As tract after tract was ceded, lands that the Indian did not
want were given to him in exchange lands devoid of good camping
places and wanting in such game as was essential to his very
existence. Moreover, the very lands the Indians prized most were
the most sought for by the whites. The qualities causing them to
be prized by the one made them desirable for the other. Thus the
Indian's subsistence became so precarious that often he was on
the verge of starvation. Coupled with this deprivation of
favorite pleasure and hunting grounds was the white man's
idealistic dream of civilizing the Indian by making him work at
tilling the soil or at the various trades. This seemed to the
haughty red man a real degradation. He could die fighting, if
need be; but work he would not. His steadfast refusal to work or
become civilized could only end in banishment from the lands he
valued so highly. In view of this policy of forcing him into an
involuntary exile, one ceases to wonder that he grew
discontented and rebelled rather than submit. He could not have
done otherwise and retain his pride of race.
Forcible dispossession of his ancestral hunting ranges, however,
would not have provoked in him an overweening hatred for the
white man if it had not been so often coupled with a show of
military force. The sole purpose of such military campaigns
seems to have been to frighten the Indian in order that he might
learn to be peaceful and pliant through fear of punishment.
These campaigns‐of which the one by General Harney against the
Sioux ending in the affair of Ash Hollow on September 3, 1855,
is the most cruel example‐sometimes ended not in pacification
but in massacre in which the ferocity of the white man vied with
that of the Indian. Harney had been recalled from Europe and
sent into the West against the Indians for no other purpose than
that of terrifying them. Such affairs as this were most unworthy
of the American soldier. Nor did the Indian soon forget these
atrocities: thereafter he seldom let an opportunity pass which
offered revenge.
The military expeditions referred to were frequently followed by
the making of treaties providing for land cessions and the
consequent westward recession of the Indians. Moreover, these
treaties, the making of which was stoutly resisted, were usually
acknowledged only by a tribal remnant; and so they were not
deemed as binding by the widely scattered major portion of the
tribe. Their provisions were not always observed, and often
blood had to flow to secure a temporary obedience. Thus the
story of the government's relations with the Sioux became an
alternation of treaties and Indian and white retaliatory
measures. A treaty was only too often accepted by the Indians as
a challenge for some shrewdly devised scheme of vengeful
retaliation.
Through a series of treaties extending from 1825 to 1851 the
Indian occupants of Iowa soil were slowly but surely
dispossessed. They felt the westward push of white migration,
and were fearful of being unable to stem it. Unluckily for
themselves they fell to intertribal quarreling, and for the
moment, being off their guard, they accepted white mediation.
Thus, the two treaties of Prairie du Chien had attempted to
settle the differences between the Sioux and their traditional
enemies, the confederated Sacs and Foxes. But they did not
succeed, since the line established in the first of these two
treaties was so indefinite that neither white man nor Indian
could locate it to his own satisfaction. To the Sioux their
claim to northern and western Iowa seemed assured, and they
proceeded confidently to its occupation. The Sacs and Foxes
believed the same concerning their rights in southeastern Iowa
and jealously sought to exclude all others from it.
By the second treaty of Prairie du Chien there was established
the Neutral Ground, which only aggravated the difficulties
already existing. Then, by the treaty of September 15, 1832, the
eastern portion of the Neutral Ground was designated as a
reservation for the Winnebagoes." The Wahpekuta Sioux never
forgot this action, which they regarded as a violation of their
proprietary rights in the district; and from that time on they
became increasingly more difficult to deal with and more restive
of restraint. Later the Winnebagoes by two successive treaties
made an absolute cession of this land." It was then opened to
settlement, and the Sioux sulkily retired westward.
In 1832 Black Hawk, the able Sac and Fox leader, burning with
revenge for past wrongs and fearful of his waning power as a
tribal leader as well as of the steady advance of the westward
moving frontier, declared war. The conflict was brief, resulting
in the defeat of Black Hawk. By four successive treaties
covering the period from 1832 to 1842 he or his people were
compelled to accede to agreements which had for their purpose
the removal of the Indians to lands west of the Missouri wholly
unsuited to their needs."
Likewise the Iowas were required to surrender all claims which
the United States had recognized in former treaties as entitling
them to occupy Iowa soil. With the surrender of all right or
interest which they held in the Iowa country they were in turn
removed to a reservation beyond the Missouri. Southern Iowa had
not as yet been cleared of its aboriginal inhabitants, for
remnants of the Pottawattamies, Chippewas, and Ottawas yet
remained. By the treaty of June 5 and 17, 1846, however, these
Indians agreed to withdraw to other reserves further west and
south.
The withdrawal of these tribes left only the Sioux who were
striving to maintain a precarious foothold in northwestern Iowa.
The steadily advancing frontier was menacing their peace of
mind, as it now became increasingly evident that they in turn
would be ejected. Two conditions, the urgent demands of alarmed
and annoyed border settlers and the troublesome character of the
Sioux themselves, determined the Indian authorities at
Washington to remove the members of these tribes. When informed
of the government's intention to remove them, the Sioux begged
to retain their lands. Notwithstanding Indian importunities
representatives of the Sissetons and Wahpetons were cited to
appear at Traverse des Sioux, Minnesota, to consider withdrawal.
Here they gloomily gathered at the time appointed. Though
outwardly ready to treat for withdrawal they did not conceal
their displeasure. On July 23, 1851, however, the treaty of
Traverse des Sioux was witnessed, by the terms of which these
Indians were to definitely withdraw from northwestern Iowa to
lands on the Minnesota River.
At the close of the conference all seemed settled. But within a
brief time the Sioux, who had not been parties to the treaty,
positively refused to abide by its provisions. Later, at
Mendota, Minnesota, on August 5, 1851, the Mdewakanton and
Wahpekuta tribes, in part, acceded to the Sisseton and Wahpeton
cessions. These cessions had not been accomplished without
considerable opposition: strong tribal parties refused their
consent outright and threatened trouble. For the period of
nearly a decade the frontier settlements of the northwest were
not free from the alarms created by these discontented bands. |
